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The Franchisor-Franchisee 
Relationship
A Key to Franchise 
Performance
by James R . Brown and 
Chekitan S. Dev
The closer the relationship between franchise headquarters and the 
on-site hotel managers, the better individual franchisees will 
perform— and the stronger the chain becomes.
importance of franchising to the devel­
opment of the U.S. lodging industry cannot be 
overstated. Franchising was the vehicle for the 
initial expansion of Holiday Inn and the motel 
segment in the 1950s. In recent years franchis­
ing has been an expansion strategy employed 
by hotel companies in all segments—making 
it unusual to find a chain that does not offer 
franchises. Industry analyst Stephen Rushmore 
found that “[f|ranchised hotels account for 
more than 65 percent of the existing U.S.
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hotel-room supply.”1 As franchising 
increases its share of the lodging 
industry, achieving higher levels of 
market growth becomes more diffi­
cult for the franchisors. Over the 
past ten years researchers have been 
investigating a new tool for gaining 
competitive advantage that falls un­
der the generic name of relationship 
marketing. This involves strengthen­
ing a firm’s relationships with its 
suppliers and its customers.2
The primary customers for hotel 
franchisors are their franchisees. 
Consequently, the relationship be­
tween a franchisor and the franchi­
sees who are responsible for operat­
ing the hotels bearing a franchisor’s 
flag is especially critical. Local fran­
chisees put into practice the plans 
and strategies formulated by the 
franchisor. Moreover, the local op­
erators are responsible for managing 
the direct contact with the chain’s 
ultimate customers, the guests.
Effective relationships between 
hotel franchisors and their franchised 
hotels are really partnerships—rela­
tionships that benefit both parties, 
not just one. Not only do both firms 
benefit from a partnership arrange­
ment, both also have a meaningful 
say regarding the strategic direction 
the partnership takes. Increasing the 
mutual participation in the decision­
making process gives partners an 
expanded stake in the success of the 
relationship and encourages them to 
work harder to ensure that success. 
As a result, building marketing part­
nerships between hotel franchisors 
and their franchisees should lead to 
higher levels of performance.
We sought to explore this propo­
sition using the following question:
1 Stephen Rushmore, “Hotel Franchising:
H ow To Be a Successful Franchisee,” Real Estate 
Journal, Summer 1997, p. 56.
2 F. Robert Dwyer, Paul F. Schurr, and Sejo Oh, 
“Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships,” Journal 
of Marketing, Vol. 51, April 1987, pp. 11-27; and 
Jan B. Heide, “Interorganizational Governance
in Marketing Channels,” Journal of Marketing,
Vol. 58, January 1994, pp. 71-85.
Does a stronger marketing partner­
ship between a hotel franchisor and  
its franchised hotel lead to higher 
performance, both for the hotel and  
the partnership as a whole?
To answer that research question 
we surveyed hotel general managers 
at properties in two major U.S. 
chains. In this article we discuss the 
notion of marketing partnerships, 
contrast them with traditional views 
of economic exchange, and clarify 
exactly what we mean by higher 
performance. We conclude by ex­
plaining the results of this study and 
discussing implications for both 
managers and researchers.
Marketing Partnerships
Traditional economic theory views 
relationships among independent 
businesses as short-term exchanges 
that are terminated at the conclu­
sion of the transaction. An example 
would be a traveling salesman 
whose car has broken down and 
who has to spend the night at an 
unfamiliar mom-and-pop motel in a 
strange town. The salesman has no 
intention of returning to the motel 
once his car is fixed and he is on the 
way to his next sales call. The terms 
of such short-term exchanges are 
simple. He trades money for the 
service of a room for the night. 
Neither the seller nor the buyer has 
any expectations for a long-term 
relationship to develop from this 
exchange. These one-shot, arm’s 
length relationships between buyers 
and sellers are termed discrete ex­
changes.3 While many transactions 
are discrete exchanges, the contem­
porary marketplace usually involves 
more-complex exchanges, usually 
involving implied or express agree­
ments and contracts.4 The plethora 
of frequent-guest programs, buyers’
3 For a discussion o f the characteristics o f  
discrete exchange, see: Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh, 
Table 1, p. 13.
4 See: Johan Arndt, “Toward a Concept o f
Domesticated Markets,5"Journal of Marketing, 43,
Fall 1979, pp. 69-75.
clubs, and affinity credit cards dem­
onstrates retailers’ efforts to extend 
their trade beyond the status of a 
discrete exchange.
Firms involved in complex ex­
changes behave more like partners 
and less like purveyors and custom­
ers in an arm’s length business trans­
action. These partnerships are longer 
term, more personal, and more in­
tertwined than discrete exchanges— 
and they often involve explicit con­
tracts. For example, because their 
franchise contracts can last up to 20 
years, Holiday Inn and its franchi­
sees are bound to each other for 
more than just a single transaction. 
Such long-term exchanges become 
personal, as, for instance, the chain’s 
field representative calls upon the 
same hotel managers time after time. 
This enables people in both the 
chain and the hotel to develop per­
sonal rapport with each other.
The partnership concept assumes 
that an organization’s success de­
pends on the success of its business 
associate. Certainly, that is the case 
in the lodging industry. An indi­
vidual hotel would have difficulty 
succeeding as a member of a weak 
chain, although local conditions 
sometimes allow that to occur. 
Similarly, a hotel chain comprising 
weak local operations will struggle, 
no matter how excellent its concept.
In addition to these general char­
acteristics, firms in effective market­
ing partnerships jointly plan to at­
tain mutual goals and objectives. 
Especially critical in guiding this 
joint planning are: (1) the mutual 
desire to preserve the relationship,
(2) role integrity, and (3) the har­
monization of marketing conflict.5
Exhibit 1 summarizes the charac­
teristics of effective marketing part­
nerships. The mutual desire to pre­
serve the relationship is based on 
the extent to which the parties view
5 Ian R . Macneil, The New Social Contract (New  
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 65.
Exhibit 1







Temporal perspective Short-term Long-term
Personal relationships Minimal Extensive
Expectation for future exchange None Substantial
Joint planning achieved through...
... Relationship preservation Low High
...Role integrity Low High
...Harmonization of marketing conflict Low High
their relationship as richer than a 
series of discrete transactions and 
the extent to which the parties 
mutually view the relationship as 
important in and of itself and the 
extent to which the firms view 
themselves as being members of 
the same team.6
A contract defines what goods or 
services each firm provides to the 
partnership and what each can ex­
pect to gain from the partnership. 
Beyond that, roles in relational part­
nerships “...cover a multitude of 
issues not directly related to any 
particular transaction.”7
Role integrity means that the 
firms in a relationship clearly under­
stand the rights and responsibilities 
of each party. The more these roles 
are clearly understood by all, the 
easier it is for partners to predict 
how each will behave, and the more 
smoothly the relationship will oper­
ate. Role integrity is critical to pro­
viding the stability necessary for 
exchange relationships to deepen.8
This characteristic encourages 
partners to make decisions and be-
6 See: Macneil; and Patrick J. Kaufmann and 
Louis W. Stern, “Relational Exchange Norms, 
Perceptions o f  Unfairness, and Retained Hostil­
ity in Commercial Litigation,”Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 32 (1988), pp. 534-552.
7 Kaufmann and Stern, p. 536.
8 Rajiv P. Dant and Patrick L. Schul, “Conflict 
Resolution Processes in Contractual Channels 
o f Distribution,” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 56, 
January 1992, p. 43.
have in ways that strengthen the 
relationship.
Enduring relationships of all 
types experience difficulties. Rela­
tional partnerships survive these 
difficulties because the parties at­
tempt to resolve their conflicts in 
mutually satisfying ways. By harmo­
nizing relational conflict, the integ­
rity of the partnership is placed 
above the separate interests of the 
individual firms.9
Franchisor-Franchisee Performance
Performance may be examined in 
terms of the performance of the 
franchisee, its franchisor, or the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship. 
We chose to investigate two of these 
aspects: how well the partnership 
performs and how well the hotel 
performs individually. To judge how 
well the hotel-franchisor relation­
ship performed overall, we relied on 
the judgment of our respondents, 
that is, the hotel general managers.
Franchisee performance for our 
purposes is a financial measure, re­
flecting both common sense and 
previous research.10 We investigated 
the hotels sales volume and its prof­
itability in terms of both gross op-
9 Macneil, p. 68.
10 See, for example: Chekitan S. Dev and 
James R . Brown, “Marketing Strategy, Vertical 
Structure, and Performance in the Lodging 
Industry: A Contingency Approach,” International 
Journal of Hospitality Management, Vol. 9 (1990), 
pp. 269-282.
erating profit and net operating 
profit.11 We also evaluated the 
hotel’s competitive performance 
against its direct competitors, as well 
as compared to other hotels of the 
same brand. We based these com­
parisons on the firm’s occupancy 
rate, its average room rental, its gross 
operating profit, its quality-assurance 
evaluations, and its guest-satisfaction 
ratings.12
To test whether a strong relation­
ship leads to higher performance, 
we studied the relationships of two 
major hotel franchisors with their 
individual North American hotel 
properties. The hotel companies 
provided us with the names of their 
hotels’ general managers, numbering 
nearly 1,400 in all. We mailed the 
questionnaire to each of the general 
managers, along with a cover letter 
supporting the research from each 
franchisor’s chief operating officer. 
The questionnaire asked the general 
managers to report on several facets 
of their hotel’s relationship with the 
franchisor headquarters, including 
the constructs under study. We re­
ceived sufficiently complete ques­
tionnaires from 331 general manag­
ers, representing a 24-percent 
response rate, which is acceptable 
for this type of research.13
To make sure that our sample 
of hotels was not biased, we con­
ducted a telephone survey of 50 
nonresponding general managers, 
asking just a few of the questions we 
posed in the mail survey. We found 
no significant differences in the 
responses of the original survey
11 Robert C. Lewis and Richard E. Chambers, 
Marketing Leadership in Hospitality: Foundations and 
Practices (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 
1989), pp. 498-499.
12 Compare with: Lewis and Chambers, pp. 
498-499, 550, and 604.
13 One study reports response rates ranging 
from 6 percent to 37 percent for studies examin­
ing business relationships. See: H.G. Parsa, 
“Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships in Quick- 
Service-Restaurant Systems,” Cornell Hotel and 
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 
(June 1996), p. 45.
respondents and those of our tele­
phone sample (p > 0.10). Therefore, 
we concluded that nonresponse bias 
was not present in this study.
Measurements
In developing our questionnaire we 
took a number of steps to eliminate 
vague wording and ambiguous ques­
tions. First, we thoroughly reviewed 
the relevant academic and practitio­
ner literature to find related survey 
items that had already been validated 
and help ensure that the original 
questions developed for this study 
were valid. Next, we pre-tested and 
refined the survey with a conve­
nience sample of over 30 hotel gen­
eral managers enrolled in a univer­
sity executive-development program. 
As a final check, senior managers in 
both hotel chains reviewed the 
questionnaire prior to its mailing.
Scoring partnerships. Because 
an effective marketing partnership 
rests on the three distinct dimen­
sions of preservation of the relation­
ship, role integrity, and harmoniza­
tion of conflict, we asked hotel 
general managers to rate their rela­
tionship with franchise headquarters 
on each of these three dimensions. 
Exhibit 2 shows the 14 question­
naire items we used to compute the 
marketing partnership scores (one 
was dropped during the statistical- 
scale purification procedure).14
We used second-order confirma­
tory factor analysis to test the valid­
ity and reliability of our marketing- 
partnership scale.15 According to
14 The questions that form the marketing- 
partnership scale are based on the work of: 
Patrick J. Kaufmann and Rajiv P. Dant,“The 
Dimensions o f  Commercial Exchange,” Marketing 
Letters, May 1992, pp. 171-185.
15 For more on measurement reliability and 
validity, see: Gilbert A. Churchill,Jr., Marketing 
Research: Methodological Foundations, 5th ed.
(Chicago: Dryden, 1991), pp. 482-501. The 
specific procedure we used is detailed in: 
Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp and Hans C.M. 
van Trijp,“The Use o f  LISREL in Validating 
Marketing Constructs,” International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, Vol. 8 (1991), pp. 283-299.
Exhibit 2 
The marketing-partnership score
If you would like to see how your firm (either hotel or chain headquarters) stacks up in 
terms of your marketing partnerships, take the following quiz. Chain executives should 
respond to this quiz with a specific hotel in mind as their partner. Hotel executives should 
respond with the brand headquarters in mind as their partner. Score each statement on 
the quiz using a 7-point scale with a “1” indicating that you “strongly disagree” with the 
statement, a “7” showing that you “strongly agree” with it, or any number in between to 
indicate degrees of disagreement or agreement.
• We expect our relationship with this partner to last a long time.
• Both my firm and this partner consider the preservation of our relationship to be 
important.
• My firm and this partner are committed to the preservation of a good working 
relationship.
• Both my firm and this partner think it is important to continue our relationship.
• Both my firm and this partner work hard at cultivating a good working relationship.
Sum the preceding five items (subtotal 1).
• Our relationship with this partner goes beyond our remitting their share of our sales 
revenue (or profits), negotiating room availability for the reservations system, and 
conforming to quality standards.
• Even though our relationship with this partner is not complex, we are still uncertain 
about who does what. (1= strongly agree to 7= strongly disagree; note the scale 
reversal for this question.)
• Our two organizations have well-formed expectations of each other which go beyond 
buying and selling of products and services.
• Even though our relationship with this partner is extremely complicated, both parties 
have clear expectations as to the role each performs.
Sum the preceding four items (subtotal 2).
• There are standard procedures for resolving disputes between my firm and this 
partner that do not involve third-party intervention.
• My firm and this partner are very conscientious, responsive, and resourceful in 
maintaining a cooperative relationship.
• Both my firm and this partner are generally able to resolve disagreements to both 
parties’ satisfaction.
• Both parties try to resolve any disagreements that arise between us in good faith.
• The high level of mutual trust between my firm and this partner enables us to settle 
our disagreements to everyone’s satisfaction.
Sum the preceding five items (subtotal 3).
Sum the three subtotal numbers. This is your marketing-partnership score.
Interpreting the marketing-partnership score
If your marketing partnership score is:
14-70 You have an arm’s length relationship with your partner. By working more like a 
team, you can improve your firm’s (and your partner’s) performance substantially. 
71-82 You have an average relationship with your partner and could improve your firm’s 
(and your partner’s) performance.
82-98 You have an excellent relationship with your partner and should be reaping the 
benefits of strong teamwork.
Exhibit 3 
Overall performance of the relationship
• The hotel’s association with franchise headquarters has been a highly successful one. 
(1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree)
• If I had to rate franchise headquarters on its performance during the past year, it would 
b e :___. (1 = poor to 7= outstanding)
• Taking a ll the different factors into account, franchise headquarters’performance has 
been:___ . (1 = bad, couldn’t be worse to 7 = excellent, couldn’t be better)
• Overall, how would you characterize your hotel’s relationship with franchise headquar­




Compared to your direct competitors, how well did your hotel do in terms o f occupancy? 
(1= much worse to 7= much better)
• Average room rate
Compared to your direct competitors, how well did your hotel do in terms o f average 
room rate? (1 = much worse to 7 = much better)
• Gross operating profit
Compared to your direct competitors, how well did your hotel do in terms o f gross 
operating profits? (1 = much worse to 7 = much better)
• Quality-assurance ratings
Compared to other hotels o f this brand, our quality-assurance ratings are well above 
average. (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree)
• Guest-satisfaction ratings
Compared to other hotels o f this brand, our guest-satisfaction ratings are well above 
average. (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree)
usual rules of interpretation, this 
analysis showed that our marketing- 
partnership scale was indeed reliable 
and valid.16 The composite reliabil­
ity coefficients were 0.83 for the 
relationship preservation subscale, 
0.60 for role integrity, and 0.80 for 
harmonization of conflict. The 
composite reliability for the overall
16 For the technically oriented, all factor load­
ings were statistically significant (p < 0.01).
The fit indices we obtained were as follows:
X2 =  248.23, df = 74, p = 0.00; GFI = 0.93;
CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.94; and B&B = 0.93. 
Except for the significant X2 statistic (the usual 
case with large sample sizes), all fit indices ex­
ceeded the 0.90 rule-of-thumb cutoff.
marketing partnership scale was 
0.97.
Next we divided the sample into 
thirds based on the marketing- 
partnership scores (Exhibit 2, bot­
tom). Parsing the sample by thirds 
resulted in scores ranging from 14 
to 70 being defined as low (33.6 
percent of our sample); 71 to 82 
were moderate (33.1 percent), and 
scores exceeding 82 are strong mar­
keting partnerships (33.3 percent).
Checking the relationship.
We asked the GMs four questions 
to assess the overall performance of 
the relationship, as listed in Exhibit 
3.17 We averaged the responses to 
these four questions to obtain our 
measure of the overall performance 
of the hotel-franchisor relationship. 
The reliability and validity of this 
measure was affirmed by a one- 
factor confirmatory factor analysis 
on the responses, which indicated 
that this was a reliable and valid 
measure of these four questionnaire 
items.18
The competitive performance of 
the hotel reflects its ability to sup­
port the franchisor’s efforts in the 
hotel’s local market. We asked each 
hotel’s general manager to compare 
his or her hotel’s performance to its 
direct competitors on three key 
operating measures—occupancy 
rate, average daily rate (ADR), and 
gross operating profit (GOP).
The general manager also com­
pared his or her hotel to other ho­
tels of the same brand in terms of 
quality-assurance ratings and guest- 
satisfaction ratings (see Exhibit 4). 
Instead of creating scales from these
17 These questionnaire items are based on 
the work of: Nirmalya Kumar, Louis W. Stern, 
and Ravi S. Achrol, “Assessing Reseller Perfor­
mance from the Perspective o f  the Supplier,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 29, May 1992, 
pp. 238-253.
18 All factor loadings were statistically signifi­
cant (p < 0.01) and the fit indices for this analy­
sis were %2 = 26.45, d f = 2, p = 0.00; GFI = 
0.97; CFI = 0.97; TLI = 0.93; and B&B = 0.98. 
The composite reliability coefficient was 0.88.
questions, we treated each item as a 
separate measure. We also judged 
that the GMs’ perceptions of these 
measures were accurate; that is, that 
they correctly reported their hotel’s 
performance. We did not seek to 
confirm these answers (which were 
on Likert-type scales) with actual 
market data.
To examine financial performance, 
we used three key indicators of the 
hotel’s financial performance—its 
sales revenue, its GOP, and its in­
come before fixed costs (see Exhibit 
5)—expressed per available room 
(i.e., r e v p a r , g o p p a r , and ib f c p a r ) 
and per available employee (i.e., 
r e v e m p , g o p e m p , and ib f c e m p ) . We 
adjusted the performance measures 
in this way to eliminate distortions 
from hotel size.
The per-available-room and per- 
available-employee bases put hotels 
on a relatively equal footing. More­
over, assessing financial performance 
in terms of rooms available and num­
ber of employees indicates how ef­
fectively the hotel uses its resources 
—physical capital (i.e., rooms) and 
labor—to generate sales revenues 
and profits. The higher the sales 
revenues per room (and, hence, 
higher franchise royalty fees), the 
happier the franchisor. The higher 
the profits, the happier the hotel 
owner.
Analytical procedure. We
used one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with the Duncan 
multiple-range test to investigate 
the proposition that greater perfor­
mance in hotel-franchisor relation­
ships is associated with stronger 
marketing partnerships.19 One-way 
ANOVA provides an overall statisti­
cal comparison of the mean responses 
to the performance measures for 
each of the three partnership group­
ings (i.e., high, medium, and low).
19 See: B.J. Winer, Statistical Principles in Experi­





Approximately what were the total annual sales for your hotel last year?
• Gross operating profit
Approximately what was the gross operating profit (GOP) for your hotei last year?
• Income before fixed charges*
Approximately what was the Income before fixed charges (IBFC) for your hotel last 
year?
• IBFC was defined for the respondents as income from all operations before 
deducting rent, property taxes, property insurance, interest, depreciation, income 
taxes, and reserve for replacement.
Exhibit 6 









Significance level p < 0.01
T h e  differences among the three case are statistically significant (p < 0.10).
Partnership and Performance
Testing the overall performance of 
the relationship using ANOVA, we 
found that the relationship’s overall 
performance does indeed vary sig­
nificantly according to its partner­
ship score (Exhibit 6). Duncan’s test 
showed that a higher relationship 
performance is associated with 
stronger marketing partnerships. 
The high group scored 5.69, while 
the medium group scored 4.95 and 
the low group achieved 3.99. Thus, 
the more the hotel and its franchise 
headquarters work as a team (in the 
GM’s view), the better the 
partnership’s overall performance. 
This result is consistent with our 
research proposition.
Exhibit 7 











Occupancy rate 3.27A 3.65B 3.68B <0.01
Average daily rate 3.40A 3.46A 3.75B <0.02
Gross operating profit 3.47A 3.67* 6 3.80B <0.05
Quality-assurance ratings 4.72A 5.216 5.40B <0.01
Guest-satisfaction ratings 4.58A 5.07B 5.20B <0.01
* Numbers with different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences 
(p < 0.10); those with the same superscripts are not statistically different at p < 0.10. 
Thus, the high group is statistically distinct from the low group, but in most instances 
not statistically different from the middle group.
Exhibit 8 













RevPAR $22.4 A $23.4A $31.0A 273 >0.10
GOPPAR $7.4A CD
<~COGO $12.4B 241 <0.08
IBFCPAR $5.8A $6.9A $9.6B 228 <0.06
RevEmp $37.9A $38.4A $40.2 A 268 >0.10
GOPEmp $12.8A $14.5A $14.9A 238 >0.10
IBFCEmp $10.0A $10.7A $13.3B 225 <0.04
* Numbers with different superscripts indicate statistically significant differences 
(p < 0.10); those with the same superscripts are not statistically different at p < 0.10. 
Thus, all three groups are statistically similar in many categories. The high group is 
statistically distinctive from the other two groups in income before fixed charges.
Exhibit 7 shows a test of our 
research proposition in terms of 
competitive performance. More 
specifically, the ANOVA results 
indicate that, compared to its direct 
competitors, when a hotel’s man­
agement and its franchisor score 
high in acting as partners:
• the occupancy rate is higher;
• average room rate is higher; and 
(consequently)
• gross operating profit is higher.
Compared to GMs’ assessment of 
other hotels of the same brand, 
moreover, the Duncan’s multiple- 
range test shows that as a hotel’s 
partnership score increases:
• quality-assurance ratings rise; and
• guest-satisfaction ratings are 
higher.
Taken together, these results are 
also consistent with our overall re­
search proposition that stronger 
partnerships between franchised 
hotels and their franchisor headquar­
ters perform better than weaker 
relationships.
Exhibit 8 shows the comparisons 
of hotel financial performance across 
the three groupings. The ANOVA 
results show that hotel financial per­
formance generally does improve as 
the hotel and its franchisor work 
more closely together. We found 
gross operating profit per available 
room (g o p p a r ) to be higher, on 
average, for the medium and strong 
marketing-partnership groups than 
for the weakest group. Income be­
fore fixed charges per available room 
(ib f c p a r ) was significantly greater 
for strong hotel—franchisor partner­
ships. Although sales revenue per 
available room appears to differ 
across the three groups, these differ­
ences were not statistically signifi­
cant.20 Thus, the stronger the hotel- 
headquarters partnership, the more 
the hotel is able to generate both 
gross operating profits as well as net 
profits from its available rooms. This 
finding is consistent with our basic 
research proposition.
Employee productivity paralleled 
room productivity. The strength of 
the hotel-franchisor partnership had 
no significant bearing upon sales
20 A mean that appears larger than another may 
not be statistically different because the statistical 
confidence interval about that mean may over­
lap with the confidence interval for the adjacent 
mean. The size o f  the confidence interval is 
directly proportional to variation about the 
mean. Thus, a larger mean with higher variation 
may not be statistically different than its much 
smaller neighbor. Such was the case here.
Partnership for Performance
The basic premise of franchising systems is that they enable 
their member firms to perform at levels unattainable by each 
firm alone. A firm can gain economies of scale by specializing in 
the performance of certain activities and delegating to a partner 
firm those activities that the partner can undertake more 
efficiently and effectively.1 For example, franchised hotels rely 
on the franchisor to provide a strategic direction for the system, 
develop coherent system-wide standards and a marketing 
program, and police the system to ensure that all hotels are 
upholding the chain’s quality standards. On the other hand, the 
franchisors rely on their individual hotels to deliver the lodging 
services that the chain promotes to its customers, not to 
mention remitting franchise fees. This specialization and 
division of effort enables the franchisor to concentrate on the 
strategies, plans, and programs for the chain and permits the 
hotels to focus upon the delivery of guest services.
The benefits of specialization and division of labor can be 
enhanced if firms treat each other as close partners rather than 
as arm’s length business associates. Being partners means that 
both the hotel and its franchisor look out for the best interests of 
the relationship rather than emphasize their own interests. The 
orientation is on increasing the overall size of the pie for both 
firms. When this happens the size of each partner’s slice will 
increase. This is in contrast to discrete exchanges where each 
firm fights over the slices of a fixed pie. The full benefits of 
partnership result when firms respond to each other’s needs in 
a flexible manner, freely share relevant information with each 
other, trust each other to make decisions beneficial to the 
partnership as a whole, and commit to growing and maintaining 
the partnership.
When firms are flexible they can adapt to changing market­
place and regulatory conditions. This provides the partnership 
with a leg up on competitive hotel chains that are not partner­
ship oriented and therefore lack the flexibility required by a 
competive environment.
Trust and commitment go hand in hand.2 When firms trust 
each other to act in the best interest of the relationship, they 
feel free to commit additional time, talent, and financial 
resources to that relationship.3 These resources enable the 
partnership to achieve performance levels unattainable without 
them. Moreover, increased trust should mean that extensive 
monitoring systems will not be needed. Any reduced monitoring 
costs transfer directly to the bottom line.4
Few studies of the performance of relational partnerships in 
business have been conducted and we are aware of none in
the hospitality industry. By and large, though, relational partner­
ships were found to achieve higher levels of performance. For 
example, in their study of buyer-vendor relationships, Noordwier, 
John, and Nevin found that buyers in relational partnerships 
experienced higher rates of on-time delivery and nondefective 
product shipments, especially when supply availability and 
prices were uncertain.5 Similarly, Heide and Stump found that 
relational partnering (as measured by the expectation that the 
relationship would continue) between original equipment buyers 
and their vendors of component parts led to increased percep­
tions of overall performance. This was especially true when 
buyers faced greater uncertainty in forecasting demand for 
those components and when they invested more heavily in 
assets to support the partnership.6 Dahlstrom, McNeilly, and 
Speh found that firms’ perceptions of the performance of their 
third-party warehouses increased the more the firm and the 
warehouse saw themselves as teammates.7 Only one study 
found no strong link between performance and relational 
partnering in business-to-business marketing8 and none has 
found a negative relationship. Therefore, we feel confident 
that these limited findings can be generalized to franchisor- 
franchisee relationships.
Thus, we developed our basic research proposition: The 
stronger the relationship between a hotel franchisor and its 
franchisees, the higher the level of performance, both for the 
franchisee and the relationship as a whole. —J.R.B. and C.S.D.
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revenue per employee (r e v e m p ) or 
gross operating profits per employee 
(g o p e m p ) .  Stronger partnerships did, 
however, generate greater net oper­
ating profits per employee ( ib f c e m p ) . 
This finding is consistent with our 
overall expectations.
Partnership for Performance
Our research indicates that if a fran­
chisor wants to improve the perfor­
mance of its hotels, it should treat
them more like partners than as 
“necessary evils” to be tolerated or, 
worse, adversaries to exploit.
Our results clearly show the 
benefits of strong marketing part­
nership to be manifold:
• Higher overall performance 
of the hotel—franchisor 
relationship;
• Higher hotel occupancy rate 
as compared to the direct 
competition;
• Higher average room rate 
as compared to the direct 
competition;
• Higher gross operating profit 
as compared to the direct 
competition;
• Higher quality-assurance ratings 
as compared to other hotels in 
the chain;
• Higher guest-satisfaction ratings 
as compared to other hotels in 
the chain;
• Higher gross operating profit 
earnings and income before in­
terest and taxes (both of them in 
terms of available rooms) than 
hotels with weaker partnerships; 
and
• Higher income before fixed costs 
(on a per employee basis) than 
hotels with weaker partnerships. 
Some franchisors clearly under­
stand the importance of working 
closely with their franchisees. For 
example, Courtyard by Marriott 
encourages its franchisees to parti­
cipate in its support and service 
programs. This strengthens the 
franchisor—franchisee relationship.
As Craig Lambert, the chain’s brand 
vice president observed, “The more 
[franchisees] are involved, the better 
the outcome.”21 In view of our 
findings, we find it surprising that 
more franchisors do not strengthen 
their partnerships with their hotels.
Our research suggests four ways 
for a chain to strengthen its hotel 
partnerships. To begin with, fran­
chisors should view the relationship 
with its hotels as important in and 
of itself and should genuinely strive 
to preserve that relationship. Here 
are three additional suggestions:
(1) Behave in a stable fashion. Re­
frain from abrupt and frequent 
changes in strategic direction 
that confuse and frustrate 
franchisees.
(2) Develop jointly with the hotel 
clear expectations as to what 
functions it is to perform and 
how it is to be evaluated. Simi­
larly, the hotel must have clear 
expectations about the support 
that it can receive from the 
franchisor. Feedback programs 
that allow the hotel to evaluate 
the franchisors performance 
on dimensions that affect it are 
also important.
21 Mike Malley, “Getting the Most Value Out of
Franchising,” Hotel and Motel Management, Bonus
Supplement, May 5, 1997, p. 42.
(3) Work in a harmonious way to 
resolve the inevitable conflicts 
that arise in any business rela­
tionship. This means ensuring 
that all parties’ concerns are 
resolved to their mutual satis­
faction. When all parties are 
satisfied, the relationship be­
comes team-oriented instead of 
adversary-oriented.
One way of ensuring satisfaction 
in franchisee—franchisor relationships 
is through the judicious use of 
power. For example, in his study of 
franchise relationships in the quick- 
service-restaurant industry, Parsa 
found franchisees to be more satis­
fied when the franchisor relied upon 
legitimate authority, relationship 
bonds, and high-quality information 
and support.22 He also found fran­
chisees to be more satisfied when 
franchisors avoided relying on coer­
cion to influence their franchisees. 
We expect the use of power in 
lodging-industry franchise relation­
ships to operate similarly.
Other researchers suggest some 
additional dimensions of marketing 
partnerships, although we did not 
explicitly study them here. Among 
them are the firms’ flexibility in 
dealing with each other, their mu­
tual sharing of information, and 
their taking a long-term orientation 
to the relationship.23 Also critical to 
effective marketing partnerships are 
mutual trust and commitment,24 fair 
treatment and just outcomes,25 and 
mutual interdependency.26 If the
partnership stresses these qualities, it 
should expect its performance to 
increase commensurately.
The Growth Factor
Hotel franchisors court additional 
franchisees as marketing partners for 
continued growth in sales revenue. In 
today’s competitive climate, potential 
franchisees, especially those with lots 
of promise, have their choice of suit­
ors and are likely to scrutinize them 
carefully. As this research makes clear, 
hotels affiliated with chains that forge 
strong partnerships are more likely to 
achieve superior performance. The 
chain that promises (and delivers) a 
strong partnership is more likely to 
have its choice of prospective hotel 
partners. Thus, developing strong 
partnerships can be a powerful tool 
that franchisors can use to recruit 
high quality franchisees.
If hotels wish to experience the 
benefits of a strong hotel-franchisor 
partnership, they must be willing to 
work on behalf of the partnership, 
perform roles that may extend be­
yond their traditional boundaries, 
and resolve their disagreements to 
the benefit of the partnership rather 
than to their own benefit. In short, 
strong partnerships require sacrifices 
on the part of both the hotel and its 
franchisor headquarters. Our research 
shows, however, that these sacrifices 
have substantial payoffs in terms of 
hotel performance as well as the 
performance of the relationship as 
a whole. CQ
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